1995 Firearm Legislation
Gary
A. Mauser[i]
Gary A. Mauser is a Professor at the Faculty of Business Administration
and the Institute for Urban Canadian Research Studies at Simon Fraser
University in Burnaby, British Columbia. Professor Mauser earned his Ph.D. from
the
Introduction
In 1995
It has been almost ten years
since
As with most controversies,
opponents and supporters seem to compete with each other in emotional hyperbole
and in cherry-picking facts to support their claims. It is time for a rational
assessment. The key question to ask is whether licensing and registration
comprise the best possible approach to improving public safety. This is of
course an exceptionally difficult question, but it must be asked. In this
article, I will make a preliminary evaluation of the effectiveness of the
firearm registry, assess the problems faced by
History
of firearms legislation in
The basic framework for modern Canadian firearm legislation was established in 1977 as part of a Parliamentary agreement that ended the death penalty.[iv] The 1977 legislation required a police permit for the first time in order to purchase any firearm (the Firearm Acquisition Certificate), defined three classes of firearms (restricted, non-restricted, and prohibited), introduced a requirement for safe storage of firearms, and banned certain types of firearms.
In 1991
In 1995, the government of
The 1995 Firearms Act was passed
by the Liberal Party as a way to appeal to feminists and met stiff opposition
in Parliament.[vi]
Three of the four opposition parties (Reform, Progressive Conservatives, and
New Democrats) despite their mutual antipathy were united against Bill C-68.
Several provincial governments actively opposed the legislation. Almost all
provinces (including
Organizational
Problems
It is not an easy task to create a large information database[viii]. Creating and managing the firearms registry posed particularly challenging problems that were underestimated by the Canadian Government. The Department of Justice failed to develop a clear understanding of the project’s scope and to plan for the level of inter-governmental and inter-agency cooperation that would be needed. Apparently, no one in the Department of Justice had experience with designing and implementing an information technology project of this size or scope. Another reason is that firearms are uniquely complex, and this complexity is reflected in the different agencies’ widely differing information needs.
Perhaps the best example of mismanagement is the department’s failure to understand that the standards for data quality varied across the agencies involved, and this created virtually insurmountable obstacles to the development of an accurate and common database. Freedom-of-Information requests have revealed that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) continue to have serious doubts about the validity and usefulness of the information the database contains.[ix]
The originally modest information technology project grew rapidly in the face of numerous demands for change. Five years after the contract for the project was awarded, the development team had dealt with more than 2,000 orders for changes to the original licensing and registration forms or to the approval processes. Many of these changes required significant additional programming rewrites. As the public learned about its problems, the quixotic nature of the firearms registry was revealed.[x]
The cost-overruns were caused by
the failure of the Government to anticipate the complexities of creating and maintaining
the firearm registry. The Canadian Government was aware of the
The problems in the Department of Justice became public when, Auditor General Sheila Fraser (2002) released a scathing report: “This is certainly the largest cost overrun we’ve ever seen in this office”, she said.[xii] The Auditor General also complained that the registry audit was the first time her office had had to discontinue an audit because the Government prevented the Auditor from obtaining the necessary information.
The Auditor General was reported as being appalled not only at the “astronomical cost overruns” but also by the flaws in the system that made it impossible for her to know the real costs.
The Auditor General’s damning
report did not include the costs of the other governmental agencies that were
working with the Department of Justice to implement licensing and firearm
registration. Member of Parliament (MP) Garry Breitkreuz (
Sheila Fraser saved her strongest criticism for the way the Government deliberately misled parliament: “The issue here is not gun control. And it's not even astronomical cost overruns, although those are serious. What's really inexcusable is that Parliament was in the dark.” The government knew about the mismanagement problems in the firearm registry years ago, but stonewalled questions from MPs such as Breitkreuz whose requests for financial information were repeatedly refused on the grounds of ‘cabinet secrecy’.
Despite the independent assessment, solutions remain elusive. In February 2003, Martin Cauchon, then Minister of Justice, relocated the registry in the Ministry of the Solicitor General along with the RCMP. The term ‘registry’ will be used as shorthand to refer to owner licensing and firearm registration together.
Early in 2004, when Paul Martin became Prime Minister, the firearm program got another Minister. Because of heightened concerns about budgetary concerns, the firearms program is in an awkward position with regard to managing the firearm registry. Tight budgetary restrictions have led to complaints that the program has reduced the quality of service. Long waits are normal, and errors frequent. Nevertheless, the registry is ineffective in tracking stolen firearms, due to duplicate serial numbers and inadequate descriptive information.[xiv] The failures reflect the inherent difficulty of the task.
Budgetary restrictions also compromise data quality. Unfortunately, one of the cost-cutting decisions was to reduce efforts to verify descriptive information submitted about firearms. Many applicants for firearm permits appear not to have been as thoroughly screened as the government claims. The screening is so poor at the firearms registry that one imaginative Canadian even managed to register a soldering gun without the officials in Ottawa knowing that it was not a ‘firearm’ under the Canadian criminal code.[xv] This example not only illustrates the level of screening given the firearm registry, but it also demonstrates contempt. Few now take seriously claims that the registry has any real use.
The 2004-2005 budget eliminated funding for firearms safety programs altogether, even though it maintained the public relations budget.[xvi] Despite the huge expenditures, the firearms registry is plagued with errors. Millions of entries are incomplete or incorrect. Fraser (2002) also reported that the RCMP in 2002 announced that it did not trust the information in the registry.[xvii]. As the New Zealand Police discovered decades ago, it is exceptionally difficult to maintain a firearm registry.[xviii] If police are to trust using the registry to protect police lives, to enforce court orders, or to testify in court, the data contained in the registry must be both accurate and complete. An inaccurate registry becomes a self-defeating exercise and cannot be useful in aiding the police protect the public.
The principle of the registry demands an exceptionally high level of accuracy to guarantee to the police officer knocking on a door that the information s/he has is correct about the number and nature of the firearms owned in the residence. If any percentage of the firearms remain unregistered, it is very likely that the firearms in the hands of the most violent criminals are not registered. If so, police officers cannot trust the information that there are no firearms in a residence. Failure to register a firearm does not mean no firearm exists. Or, if there is only one firearm registered, the officer cannot infer there are no other firearms. In any case, the Canadian registry does not keep track of where the firearm is stored. Practically speaking, the police officer must assume a firearm might be available when s/he knocks on a door, whatever is reported in the registry. Trusting the information in the registry could get police officers killed. Despite its current cost of over one billion dollars, the firearms registry is not useful to the police.[xix]
In summary: there have been numerous action plans, four Ministers in charge of the firearms program, and thousands of changes made to the computer system. This is not a recipe for effectiveness or efficiency. Additionally, a registry that only includes a portion of the gun inventory is a guarantee that it only has those firearms that are the least likely to be used in crime.
Cooperation
It is difficult to know the
level of nonparticipation because there is no agreed number of firearm owners
in
However, the estimates of the number of firearm owners in 2001 range from the CFC’s estimate of 2.2 million to the National Firearm Association’s estimate of 7 million. Estimates of non-participation in the registry range from 10% to over 70%. In 2001, the best estimate was that there were 4.5 million firearms owners.[xxi] If this is correct, then about half of all firearms owners (45%) have a valid firearm licence. However, there is good reason to believe the number of lawful firearm owners has declined since 2001. Thus, the participation rate could be somewhat higher than these figures suggest.
The number of firearm owners may
in fact be shrinking since the surveys were conducted in 2001. A failure to
continue with the shooting sports bodes ill for wildlife conservation in
Estimates of participation rates
among Aboriginal Canadians is even lower – less than 25% of residents of First
Nation communities are estimated to have complied with the firearms act[xxv].
One band in B.C. has even decided, in defiance of
Estimates of the actual gun
supply range from 7.7 million (the government's preferred number) to over 25
million rifles and shotguns in
Thus, the best estimate is that
approximately half (56 %) of the private firearm stock is registered. However,
this figure, by the nature of its derivation, introduces a further
complication. Obviously, since this is based upon telephone surveys, it
excludes any weapons in the hands of criminals, as criminals are extremely
unlikely to be contacted, or if contacted, to respond honestly in surveys.
In summary, it is difficult to
know the level of nonparticipation among Canadians because there is no agreed
number of firearm owners in
Table 1. Gun crime in
Number Percentage
|
Illegal
possession of a weapon |
10,037 |
47% |
|
Other
offensive weapons charges |
4,510 |
21% |
|
Robbery
involving a firearm |
3,877 |
18% |
|
Firearm
usage |
2,256 |
11% |
|
Homicide
involving a firearm |
161 |
1% |
|
Discharge
firearm with intent |
223 |
1% |
|
Trafficking |
137 |
1% |
|
Total
crimes involving firearms |
21,201 |
100% |
Source: Table 2.3.
Police reported incidents, 2003, Canadian Crime Statistics, 2003, Cat no
85-205-XIE; Table 7, “Homicide in
The most appropriate ways to evaluate improvements in public safety are general measures, e.g., the trend in violent crime or total homicide, not just gun crime.[xxx] There are several reasons for this. First, not all gun crime involves violence. A significant portion (47%) of gun crime consists of permit violations. Thus, trends in gun crime may reflect nothing more than changing levels of bureaucratic activity. This point becomes especially important at a time when legislative changes produce new and more complex licensing and registration requirements that result in more kinds of offences.
Table 2. Gun violence and violent crime
|
|
Violent crime
involving firearms |
Homicide involving
firearms |
Robbery involving
firearms |
|
|
1% |
14% |
6% |
|
|
1% |
9% |
4% |
|
|
2% |
31% |
14% |
Sources: Sources: Canada,
Kwing Hung (March 2004) Firearm Statistics, Updated Tables, Department of
Justice; Wallace, Marnie (2003) “Crime Statistics in Canada, 2003,” Juristat,
Vol 24, No 6; Mouzos, J. (1999) Firearm Related Violence: The Impact of the
Nationwide Agreement on Firearms, Trends and Issues 151, Australia Institute of
Criminology; Mouzos, J. (2003) Homicide in Australia 2001-2002, Research and
Public Policy Issues 46, Australia Institute of Criminology; Reuter, P. and
Mouzos, J. (2002) “Australia: A Massive Buyback of Low-Risk Guns,” paper
presented at the American Society of Criminology, Chicago; England and Wales,
Home Office (2001) Criminal Statistics, England and Wales (2000), Norwich,
England.
Second, gun violence is a very
small percentage of violent crime, typically under 5%. While gun misuse is
important, the more important goal is to reduce the overall level of criminal
violence.
Figure 1 shows that, after a
slight decline in the early 1990s, violent crime rates have remained steady
ever since. There is no discernible impact from the firearms program. General
legislation focused on normal people who own firearms does not result in
reducing death or violence. Apparently, firearm restrictions simply motivate
criminals to substitute other weapons to commit violent crimes. In fact,
violent crime is falling faster in the
Allan Rock, the Justice Minister who was responsible for introducing the Canadian firearm legislation, claimed that the reason for the gun registry was to save lives[xxxii]. This criterion is also implied in the 2003 Report of the Commissioner, which stated that the Canadian Firearms Centre will work primarily to increase public safety by “helping reduce death, injury and threat from firearms through responsible ownership, use and storage of firearms.[xxxiii]”
Table 3. Homicide in
|
|
1996 |
1997 |
1998 |
1999 |
2000 |
2001 |
2002 |
2003 |
|
Homicide
Rate |
1.7 |
1.7 |
1.8 |
1.8 |
1.6 |
1.9 |
1.6 |
1.6 |
|
%
Firearm |
33.5 |
25.3 |
16.7 |
14.4 |
18.8 |
12.6 |
13.2 |
12.6 |
Sources: Mouzos, Jenny and
Catherine Rushford, Firearms Related Deaths in
Table 4. Armed Robbery in
|
|
1996 |
1997 |
1998 |
1999 |
2000 |
2002 |
2003 |
|
Armed Robbery Rate |
6256 |
9054 |
10850 |
9452 |
9474 |
7817 |
7162 |
|
% Firearm |
25.3 |
24.1 |
17.6 |
15.2 |
14.0 |
14.9 |
15.5 |
Sources: Australian Bureau
of Statistics, Recorded Crime, 1993-2001,
May 2001, #4510.0; plus ABS updates in Recorded Crime, 2002, 2003, #4510.0.
While it may seem reasonable for the Canadian Firearms Centre to focus on reducing deaths involving firearms, it is misleading and untrue to claim that gun death per se is central to public safety. As can be seen in the table, gun deaths are primarily suicides.
Table 5. Canadian Gun Deaths
Homicide Suicide Total
|
1991 |
271 |
1108 |
1379 |
|
1995 |
176 |
916 |
1092 |
|
1998 |
151 |
818 |
969 |
|
2001 |
171 |
651 |
822 |
Source: Kwing Hung,
“Firearm Statistics, Updated Tables,” Research and Statistics Division,
Department of Justice, March 2004.
The category, gun death, is a mixture of violent ways to die, linked, as the name suggests, only by the tool used for killing the individual. Thus, to the extent that restrictions on firearm availability are effective, people may find and use other tools. Unfortunately, alternative means of committing murder or suicide are all too readily available.
Table 6. Canadian Suicide Trends
Firearms Hanging Total
Suicides Suicides Suicides
|
1991 |
1110 |
1034 |
3593 |
|
1995 |
916 |
1382 |
3968 |
|
1998 |
818 |
1434 |
3698 |
|
2001 |
651 |
1509 |
3688 |
Source: Kwing Hung, “Firearm
Statistics, Updated Tables,” Research and Statistics Division, Department of
Justice, March 2004.
In evaluating public safety, we need to avoid being misled by overly simple concepts like gun death. This concept is too heterogeneous to be useful in guiding policy. To avoid confusion, we need to consider the components of gun death separately or else we end up considering an irrelevance and calling it germane. First, consider suicide. Unfortunately, while gun suicides have declined since 1995, it is illogical to credit the firearms program with saving any lives. See Figures 4 and 5.
While it is true that fewer
people have used firearms to commit suicide since 1995, it is also true that
there has been an almost identical increase in suicide by hanging and other
means. Similar trends can be seen in
The second largest category of
gun deaths is homicide. As with suicide, we can see that deaths involving
firearms have declined also in the past decade. Also, unlike suicide, the
homicide rate has fallen appreciably. This decline has led some to claim that
the firearms program has been successful. Unfortunately, upon closer scrutiny,
this argument appears implausible. The first clue is that, as with suicide, the
downward trend began well before the 1995 law was operational. It took three
years for the regulations to be drafted so the law could be put into effect. Firearm
owners were not required to get licences until 2001, and, as observed earlier,
firearm registration did not begin until 1998, and all firearms were not
required to be registered until 2003. Second, the homicide rate is declining
faster in the
Third, a closer analysis of the homicide data does not show much support for a link between the declines in firearm homicides and total homicides. The percentage of homicides involving firearms has remained fairly constant for the past decade. It was 31% in 1993, and 29% in 2003[xxxiv]. Moreover, while the number of family homicides appears to be declining, the proportion involving firearms has remained surprisingly constant, at around 24%[xxxv].
In contrast, the number of homicides that are related to gang activity is increasing. These typically involve handguns. Although, handguns have been registered since the 1930s, this has not acted to reduce the criminal misuse of firearms.
Conclusion
The 1995 Firearms act was never
justifiable on policy grounds, as it was entirely partisan. Ten years after
passage, it can now be shown to have failed to improve public safety or to save
lives. As
Ten years after the legislation
was passed, the firearms registry has failed to win the trust of the public or
the police. It is difficult to assess the percentage of firearms owners who are
participating, but between 900,000 and 2.5 million gun owners have failed to
get a licence or register a firearm. Despite its limitations, or possibly
because of them, the legislation may have contributed to the decline in the
number of people who own firearms and who hunt. While the drop in firearm
owners may contribute to the drop in firearm deaths, this has not caused any
reduction in homicide or suicide rates. Unfortunately, the decline in firearm
owners has hurt the economy of rural
Ten years later, the firearms registry is incomplete and replete with errors. It is difficult to imagine that it could be more successful given another ten years. From the evidence, the registry has not been able to demonstrate any successes in reducing homicide, suicide or violent crime rates despite having, in effect, no budgetary limitations. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the firearm registry will be able to demonstrate greater success in improving public safety in the current political climate where it is being called to account for its fiscal excesses.
It is time to return to the key question, asked in the introduction, whether the focus on licensing and registration is the best possible approach to improve public safety. One might argue that there are more cost-effective steps that could be taken in a bid to do so:
Increase prison sentences for criminals who have been convicted of violent crimes. Reconsider early release programs. Build more prisons.
Increase court budgets to reduce waiting time for trials.
Improve screening procedures at immigration in order to identify people who have records of violent crime.
Improve deportation efforts so we can ensure that immigrants already in the country who have records of violent crime actually leave the country[xxxvi].
The firearms registry is not able to demonstrate its effectiveness at improving public safety. Nevertheless, the government maintains that its goal in this very expensive program remains public safety. One could speculate about why the governmental actors involved in the current firearms program have continued to support a program, with ever increasing budgets, that has not been able to demonstrate results that stand up to scrutiny. The answer may well be rooted in laudable aims, notably the wish to cut down human suffering. Or it may be more political.
If the goal is to improve public safety, then it is time to recognize that three objective tests – violent crime rate, homicide rate, suicide rate – show the firearms program to be ineffective. Consequently the focus on normal citizens should cease and the focus should instead be on violent criminals. Budgets are limited, and it is wise to focus efforts on those threats that are the most serious. The RCMP admits that its budget is so tight it cannot afford to fight terrorism[xxxvii].
End notes